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INTRODUCTION 
Appellant Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C. ("Wolf) seeks to avoid the trial court's 
determination that three years of active participation in this litigation constitutes a waiver 
of Wolf s alleged right of arbitration. Wolf then asserts its actions should be ignored 
because its right to arbitrate cannot be waived. Such arguments are contrary to the 
undisputed facts and applicable law. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3 1 a-19 
(1999) and 78A-3-102 (2009). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue #1: Whether the trial coi irt properly found that Wolf waived any potential 
contractual right to arbitration that it might have had? 
Standard of Review: 
Wolf misstates the governing standard of review. It is well-settled Utah law that 
'"whether the trial court employed the proper standard of waiver presents a legal question 
which is reviewed for correctness, but the actions or events allegedly supporting waiver 
are factual in nature and should be reviewed as factual determinations, to which we give a 
district court deference.'" Cent. Florida Inv., Inc. v. Parkwest Assoc, 2002 UT 3, ^  20, 
40 P.3d 599 (quoting Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, % 16, 982 P.2d 572 (citing 
1 
Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah 1992))); see also Smile Inc. 
AsiaPte. Ltd v. BriteSmile, 2005 UT App. 381, % 20, 122 P.3d 654. 
A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly 
erroneous. See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, Tj 19, 100 P.3d 1177. "In order to establish 
that findings of fact are clearly erroneous, '[a]n appellant must marshal the evidence in 
support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence.' Tf 
the evidence is inadequately marshaled, this court assumes that all findings are 
adequately supported by the evidence.'" Cache County v. Beus, 2005 UT App 503, \ 6, 
128 P.3d 63 (citation omitted). 
Wolf argues that the trial court "conducted no evidentiary hearing'" prior to 
denying its Motion to Compel Arbitration, and therefore, the trial court's decision was a 
legal conclusion subject to little if any deference on appeal. See Wolfs Brief at 4. The 
trial court did not need to conduct an evidentiary hearing in order to determine whether or 
not Wolf substantially participated in this litigation and the ASC Parties have suffered 
prejudice; the record on its face provides ample evidence. Moreover, Wolf did not 
request an evidentiary hearing. Wolf does not cite to any law that requires a trial court to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing in order to support a finding of waiver. To the contrary, a 
mere filing of a summary judgment motion is sufficient to support a finding of waiver. 
See Baker v. Stevens, 2005 UT 32, 114 P.3d 580. 
2 
Last, the case cited by Wolf in support of this argument is inapposite. The issue 
presented in McCoy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, 1999 UT App 199, 98U i 
694, was whether or not the parties had agreed to submit their disputes to arbitration. The 
Utah Court of Appeals determined this was a question of law to be reviewed for 
correctness. See id. at 646-97. The McCoy court ultimately found that because Blue 
Cross failed to show that its insured received adequate notice of the arbitration provision, 
Blue Cross had failed to establish the existence of a binding arbitration agreement. Id. at 
699-700. Therefore, the standard of review applied in McCoy has no application to the 
present appeal. 
Issue #2: Does this Court's years of precedence in applying the equitable doctrine 
of waiver in the context of the Utah Arbitration Act and Utah Uniform Arbitration Act 
violate the provisions of those Acts and the Utah Constitution? 
DETERMINATIVE STA1 0 FES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-3 (1999): 
A written agreement to submit any existing or future controversy to arbitration is 
valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds existing at law or equity 
to set aside the agreement, or when fraud is alleged as provided in the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-4 (1999) (attached as Addendum) 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a breach of contract case. The contract at issue is a July 3, 1997 Ground 
Lease between ASC Utah, Inc. d/b/a The Canyons ("ASCI?")1 and Wolf Mountain 
Resorts, L.C. ("Wolf), whereby ASCU purchased what was then known as Wolf 
Mountain ski resort. The Ground Lease was structured such that the land Wolf held in 
fee was leased to ASCU for up to 200 years, with an exclusive option for ASCU to 
acquire the Wolf land as ASCU developed what became known as The Canyons. The 
right to purchase land specifically included land necessary to construct a golf course. 
The heart of ASCTTs case is Wolfs pattern and practice of delaying and 
obstructing development at The Canyons Resort in contravention to its Ground Lease 
obligations. Wolfs tactics crescendoed in April 2006 when it refused to convey to 
ASCU the land necessary to construct a golf course, in violation of its Ground Lease 
obligations. 
After actively participating in this litigation for approximately three years, Wolf 
asked the trial court to compel arbitration of certain claims that Wolf argued arose from a 
November 1999 Amended and Restated Specially Planned Area Development Agreement 
("SPA Agreement"'). The trial court denied Wolfs motion on the basis that Wolf had 
1
 In addition to ASCU, this Brief is also submitted on behalf of American Skiing 
Company ("ASC"), American Skiing Resort Properties, Inc., Blaise Carrig and Leslie 
Otten. These parties are collectively referred herein as ''Appellees" or the UASC Parties". 
4 
waived any potential right to arbitration it may have had.2 Wolf has appealed that 
finding. 
Course of Proceedings 
On June 14, 2006, ASCU filed its initial Complaint, and on July 28, 2006, filed a 
First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), asserting that Wolf breached the Ground Lease. (R. 
1-12, 223-60). In September 2006, Wolf filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was denied. 
(R. 392-423, 579-80). In mid-December 2006, Wolf filed an Answer, Counterclaim, and 
a First Amended Complaint. (R. 579-80, 711-817). Wolf asserts that many of these 
claims arise from the SPA Agreement. (R. 3339-51). Notably, Wolf did not assert any 
right to arbitration. (R. 579-80, 711-817). 
After participating in discovery and motion practice for nearly three years, on 
March 12, 2009, Wolf asked the trial court for leave to amend its pleadings to add eleven 
new parties to the litigation. (R. 284-95). These parties were other landowners in The 
Canyons vicinity who Wolf claimed had not met their obligations in April 2006 regarding 
the golf course at The Canyons. (R. 2487-88). The trial court denied Wolfs motion 
because of "the delay and lack of viable explanation for the delay and prejudice to all 
parties in allowing this late amendment." (R. 3079). The trial court's Ruling contained a 
line of dicta regarding the arbitration provision of the SPA Agreement that the court 
2
 As Wolf acknowledges, the Court did not rule upon the issue of whether or not an 
arbitration agreement existed or applied to any particular claims. 
5 
expressly stated was not the basis of its Ruling: "While the court need not and does not 
base its decision on this argument, the court agrees with third party defendants that the 
SPA Agreement does require arbitration." (R. 3082) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, 
Wolf seized upon this statement in its continued attempt to derail and delay resolution of 
this case. (R. 3082). On May 18, 2009, with less than two months remaining in the fact 
discovery period, Wolf filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration. (R. 3339-51). 
Disposition in the Trial Court 
On June 26, 2009, the trial court denied Wolfs motion, finding that Wolf 
substantially participated in this litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to 
arbitrate and the ASC Parties have been prejudiced by Wolfs failure to demand 
arbitration in a timely manner. As a result, Wolf waived any potential right that it might 
otherwise have had to compel arbitration. (R. 4005-4036). On July 8, 2009, Wolf filed 
an appeal of the trial court's Ruling and Order denying Wolfs Motion to Compel 
Arbitration. (R. 4239-43). 
Statement of Facts 
Background 
On July 3, 1997, ASCU and Wolf entered into an agreement whereby ASCU 
purchased what was then known as Wolf Mountain ski resort.3 (R. 36, 225). ASCU's 
3
 Contrary to Wolfs unsupported assertion, ASCU's former parent company, ASC was 
not, and is not, a tenant under the Ground Lease. (R. 223-60 at Ex. A p. 1). 
6 
acquisition of the Wolf Mountain ski resort was structured as a purchase of essentially all 
of the assets of Wolf with the exception of land, which was leased to ASCU for up to 200 
years under a written Ground Lease Agreement, dated July 3,1997, as amended by the 
Closing Agreement, and four subsequent written amendments thereto (hereinafter 
referred to collectively as the "Ground Lease"). (R. 223-60 at Exs. A, B, C, D and E, see 
esp. Ex. A at 1, 2-5). 
The Ground Lease was structured "to provide a mechanism whereby Landlord 
could sell to Tenant and Tenant could purchase from Landlord its fee interest in certain 
parcels within the leased premises for development by Tenant as more particularly 
described in Article XXV." (R. 223-60 at Ex. A p. 1). Under the Ground Lease, as 
ASCU develops the property, it exercises an option (for which it paid a substantial sum 
under the terms of the Ground Lease) wherein title to the property transfers from Wolf to 
ASCU. (R. 223-60 at Ex. A pp. 25-28). Through the Second Amendment to the Ground 
Lease, the option expressly includes land necessary to construct an 18-hole golf course. 
(R. 223-60 at Ex. Cp. 3). 
Under Section 25.07 of the Ground Lease, ASCU agreed to produce and submit a 
master development plan to Summit County. (R. 223-60 at Ex. A p. 28). In furtherance 
of ASCU's development efforts, in November 1999, ASCU, along with Summit County, 
as well as numerous other landowners and developers in the area, including Wolf, entered 
into the Amended and Restated Development Agreement for the Canyons Specially 
7 
Planned Area, also referred to as the "SPA Agreement." (R. 223-60 at Ex. G). Appellees 
ASC, Leslie B. Otten and Blaise Carrig are not parties to the SPA Agreement. (R. 223-
60 at Ex. G; 4541 at Ex. A pp. 2-3).4 The SPA Agreement sets forth the parameters for 
development in The Canyons Specially Planned Area and the public benefits therefrom. 
(R. 47, 223-60 at Ex. G). 
Effective on November 12, 1999, ASCU and Wolf entered into the Second 
Amendment to the Ground Lease. (R. 223-60 at Ex. C). As part of that amendment, the 
parties expressly agreed that ASCU's obligations under Section 25.07 were satisfied upon 
approval of the SPA Agreement. (R. 223-60 at Ex. C p. 5). The SPA Agreement was 
approved on November 15, 1999. (R. 223-60 at Ex. C; 4541 at Ex. A pp. 2-3). 
Since July of 1997, ASCU has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in 
developing The Canyons, which amounts include tens of millions of dollars paid to Wolf 
under the Ground Lease for rent, option rights and land purchases. (R. 225). Since 
ASCU acquired the resort in 1997, several large hotel, condominium and time share 
projects have been developed in the area, significantly increasing the bed base. In 
addition, the ski terrain, number of ski trails and number of ski lifts have all more than 
doubled. All of these improvements have resulted in the number of skier visits having 
increased from approximately 60,000 per year to in excess of 400,000 per year. (R. 225-
4
 Nevertheless, Wolf has sought to compel some of its claims against ASC, Messrs. Otten 
and Carrig into arbitration. See (R. 771-72, 805-08, 810-13, 3347). 
8 
26). As a result of ASCU's efforts, The Canyons is recognized as a world class ski 
resort, boasting one of the largest ski terrains in the United States. (R. 4541 at Ex. A p. 
35). The Canyons is an important commercial enterprise within the Park City area that 
provides many benefits to the employees who work there, the owners and developers of 
land in and around The Canyons, and to the public at large. (R. 47). 
The heart of ASCU's case against Wolf is Wolfs pattern and practice of delaying 
and obstructing development at The Canyons in contravention to its Ground Lease 
obligations. Wolfs actions prevented construction of a golf course at The Canyons resort 
from proceeding. (R. 223-60, see esp. 231-34 and Ex. I). In Spring 2006, all the 
participating landowners executed the deeds and other documents necessary for golf 
course construction to begin, except one: Wolf. (R. 4541 at Ex. A p. 11). Not 
coincidentally, on March 31, 2006, Wolf issued a Default Notice to ASCU alleging that 
ASCU breached the terms of the Ground Lease by executing a Restatement of Agreement 
with the Osguthorpes five years earlier without Wolfs prior written consent. (R. 223-60 
at Ex. Q). Although Wolf knew of this alleged default for several years, it deliberately 
waited to assert it until Wolf thought it was to its strategic advantage to attempt to gain 
concessions from ASCU in the golf course transaction. (R. 223-60 at Exs. P and Q). 
In April 2006, pursuant to Section 25.03 of the Ground Lease, ASCU sent Wolf a 
notice of ASCU's election to exercise its option to acquire from Wolf the land necessary 
for the golf course development, specifying the date and location for the closing. (R. 
9 
223-60 at Ex. H). Wolf did not appear at the closing, and did not convey the parcels to 
ASCU. (R. 233-34). Thus, the golf course could not proceed. 
Procedural History 
In June 2006, ASCU filed its initial Complaint seeking declaratory relief related to 
the March 31, 2006 Default Notice and successfully moved for a preliminary injunction. 
(R. 1-49,209-211). In July 2006, ASCU filed an amended Complaint alleging that Wolf 
breached the Ground Lease in a myriad of ways over the years, including its conduct with 
respect to development of real estate and the golf course. (R. 223-60). 
Because Wolfs conduct in April 2006 also violated the SPA Agreement, in May 
through October 2006, Summit County independently pursued Wolf for its violation of 
the provisions of the SPA Agreement related to the golf course transaction. (R. 4541 at 
Ex. A p.l 1). Specifically, Summit County filed suit against Wolf in August 2006. Id. 
On September 15, 2006, Wolf filed a Motion to Dismiss ASCU's FAC on various 
grounds, including with respect to the SPA Agreement: that ASCU's purported efforts 
"to enforce the SPA Agreement are barred by the statute of limitations," for failure to join 
the other parties to the Agreement, as well as a failure of consideration. (R. 329-423). 
Wolf did not assert the claims should be compelled to arbitration. 
In mid-December 2006, after having its motion to dismiss summarily denied by 
the trial court (R. 579-80), Wolf filed an Answer and Counterclaim (R. 711-70), and a 
First Amended Complaint (R. 771-817), alleging almost identical claims in a different 
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case that has since been consolidated into this case. Tellingly, Wolf did not raise the 
issue of arbitration in any of its pleadings, even though Wolf views its claims as arising 
under the SPA Agreement. See id. 
The trial court entered the first Case Management Order, to which Wolf stipulated, 
in October 2006. (R. 544-47). Since the fall of 2006, the parties, including Wolf, have 
engaged in extensive discovery, including the exchange of voluminous written discovery, 
the issuance of subpoenas duces tecum, and the taking of over 32 depositions, 16 of 
which Wolf noticed and initiated. (R. 627-29, 650-65, 915-22,1091-93, 1123-38,1196-
1209, 1214-64, 1267-84, 1288-1316, 1330-41, 1436-39, 1542,1545-46, 1626-30, 1985-
87,). See generally Record Index. 
Specifically, Wolf has served four sets of Requests for Production of Documents, 
containing more than 400 separate requests; two sets of Interrogatories, containing 48 
separate queries; and two sets of Requests for Admission, containing 45 separate 
requests, upon the ASC Parties. (R. 853-54, 1208-09, 3587, 3598). As of May 2009, the 
ASC Parties had produced over 150,000 pages of documents to Wolf. (R. 3580-610 at 
Ex. D and 3646-49). Moreover, Wolf has responded to multiple rounds of written 
discovery (R. 1074-75, 1091-93, 1255-56, 1275-76, 3586-87), amended and 
supplemented its discovery responses (R. 1545-46), and subpoenaed documents from 
more than numerous third parties. (R. 1214-45, 1761-64,3040-41). Because of on-going 
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discovery disputes, the trial court also appointed a special master to assist with discovery. 
(R. 2276-81). 
The trial court has heard and ruled upon numerous motions, many of which were 
filed by Wolf. (R. 268-75, 392-423, 457-83, 610-26, 1154-64, 1174-82, 1365-74, 1384-
93, 1410-22, 1455-57, 1546-55, 1645-57, 1854-65,2037-48,2123-46). See generally 
Record Index. For instance, Wolf has filed a motion to dismiss (R. 392-423), a stipulated 
motion for case management order (R. 540-43), a motion to compel responses to written 
discovery requests (R. 1174-82), a motion for an order increasing the bond posted by 
ASCU for preliminary injunction (R. 1410-22), motions relating to various scheduling 
issues (R. 2500-08), a motion to amend the case management order (R. 3391-413), 
motions to compel depositions (R. 3478-91), and motions to compel responses to 
subpoenas (R. 3956-66). 
During the course of the litigation, ASCU filed two separate Motions for 
Summary Judgment, both of which were denied after Wolf sought Rule 56(f) relief. (R. 
370-91, 457-83, 1658-70, 2123-46). The trial court has extended the discovery schedule 
with Wolfs input on two occasions, and the last order from September 2008 held that 
fact discovery was to be completed by July 1, 2009. (R. 1971-79, 2013-28). 
In January 2009, Wolf filed a Third Party Complaint purporting to add eleven new 
parties to this case. (R. 2282-322). Wolf filed the Third Party Complaint without leave 
of court, over two years after having answered ASCU's First Amended Complaint, after 
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extensive discovery already had occurred, with only a few7 months left in the discovery 
period. See id; see also Record Index. On March 12, 2009, Wolf finally filed the 
requisite Motion for Leave to add the eleven new parties (R. 284-95). 
The trial court rejected Wolfs attempt because it was untimely and prejudicial, 
holding that: 
With numerous depositions scheduled in the next two months under the direction 
of a special master, a step back in discovery is prejudicial to all parties and to the 
concept of fairness to all parties. These claims by Wolf, whatever their merit, are 
procedurally flawed in this case and the court will not allow the amendment 
sought by Wolf given the delay and lack of viable explanation for the delay and 
prejudice to all parties in allowing this late amendment. 
(R. 3079). Unfortunately, although the trial court made it clear it was not a part of its 
ultimate holding, it did include one line of dicta remarking that the SPA Agreement may 
require arbitration of the claims that Wolf had asserted against the putative third party 
defendants. (R. 3082). This is the language upon which Wolf seized, and thereafter, 
based its claimed right to arbitrate the Ground Lease claims between the ASC Parties and 
Wolf. (R. 3339-51). 
Wolf wrongly asserts that the trial court denied leave to file its Third Party 
Complaint because of the arbitration provision in the SPA Agreement. See Wolfs Brief 
at 1, 8, 14, 20 and 26. This simply is not true. The trial court made it abundantly clear 
that its statement regarding the arbitration provision of the SPA Agreement was not any 
part of the basis for its denial of Wolf s Motion for Leave to Amend: uWhile the court 
defendants that the SPA Agreement does require arbitration." (R. 3082) (emphasis 
added). 
The truth of the matter is that the trial court denied Wolfs Third-Party Complaint 
because it was untimely and improper under Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The court found that there was substantial delay in seeking to add the third 
parties, without sufficient explanation for the delay. In other words, Wolf slept on its 
rights and, therefore, waived them. (R. 3065-87, 4546-66). 
On May 18, 2009, with less than two months left in the fact discovery period, 
Wolf filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration. (R. 3339-51). On June 26, 2009, the trial 
court denied Wolfs motion because Wolfs: 
actions over the past three years have failed to communicate an intent to arbitrate 
while heavily participating in many facets of litigation. Allowing Wolf to assert 
its rights to arbitration this late in the case would prejudice the ASC Parties 
because they have spent three years participating in highly contested litigation . . . 
The reasons Utah courts favoring [sic] arbitration, expedience and conservation of 
resources, would be largely defeated by conducting arbitration this late. Wolf has 
waived its right to arbitration by its actions up to this juncture, and its Motion to 
Compel Arbitration should be denied. 
(R. 4033-34). 
The court used a phrase coined by Utah appellate courts, noting: u Wolf has . . . tested the 
judicial waters and found them bitter and is thus seeking arbitration." (R. 4562); see also 
Smile Inc. Asia Pte. Ltd. v. BriteSmile Mgmt, Inc., 2005 UT App 381, \ 37, 122 P.3d 
654. 
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On July 8, 2009, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-19 (1999), Wolf filed a 
notice of appeal of the trial court's Ruling and Order denying Wolfs Motion to Compel 
Arbitration. (R. 4239-43). 
ASCU's First Amended Complaint and Wolfs Counterclaims Are Premised 
on the Ground Lease Between the Parties, Not the SPA Agreement 
Despite Wolfs assertions to the contrary, the claims in ASCU's FAC do not "arise 
out of the SPA Agreement." Wolfs Brief at 11. Wolf cites the Court to various 
provisions of ASCU's FAC as alleged support for its argument that ASCU is seeking 
remedies under the SPA Agreement. See Wolfs Brief at 11. However, a simple review 
of the allegations in ASCU's FAC reveals that ASCU's claims against Wolf are based 
upon the Ground Lease, not the SPA Agreement. For instance, Paragraph 90 of ASCU's 
FAC expressly alleges: "Wolf breached the Ground Lease by the conduct alleged above, 
including by " (R. 248) (emphasis added). Similarly, paragraph 94 asserts a breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the Ground Lease. (R. 247-48) 
(emphasis added). 
In Paragraph 99 of its FAC, ASCU specifies the basis for its intentional 
interference with economic relations claim against Wolf: "In breaching the Ground Lease 
...." (R. 250) (emphasis added). Wolf makes a selective and partial quote of Paragraph 
107 in an effort to make it appear that the Fourth Cause of Action is based on the SPA 
Agreement. See Wolf s Brief at 11. This is false and misleading. The relief sought in 
the Fourth Cause of Action does not arise under the SPA Agreement, but instead seeks a 
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declaration that "ASCU has performed all material conditions required to be performed 
by it under the Ground Lease, except as such conditions have been waived, excused or 
prevented by Wolf." (R. 252) (emphasis added). 
Moreover, in Paragraph 119, ASCU seeks specific performance under the Ground 
Lease requiring Wolf to convey the golf course land that ASCU attempted to exercise its 
option upon under Article XXV and the Second Amendment of the Ground Lease. See 
Supra at 7; (R. 253-54). Paragraphs 114-16 make it perfectly clear that ASCU's specific 
performance claim is based upon the Ground Lease. (R. 253). 
Similarly, Wolf makes a selective, partial quote of Paragraph 68(3) of its 
Counterclaim in a misleading manner to make it seem as if its Third Cause of Action is 
seeking damages under the SPA Agreement for violation of the SPA Agreement. See id. 
Although Wolf purposefully omits the phrase "Ground Lease" from its quoting of 
Paragraph 68, an entire reading of the paragraph leaves no question that it is not seeking 
remedies under the SPA Agreement. Paragraph 68 states: "ASCU materially breached 
the Ground Lease by the conduct alleged above, including, but not limited to ... 3) 
Various failures to fulfill its development obligations under the Ground Lease and SPA 
Agreement (which is further incorporated as an obligation under the Second Amendment 
to the Ground Lease) ...." (R. 758-59) (emphasis added). Paragraph 71 of Wolf s 
Counterclaim concludes the Third Cause of Action by seeking to "terminate the Ground 
Lease and recover damages arising therefrom" based upon ASCU's alleged "breaches of 
16 
the Ground Lease." (R. 760) (emphasis added). The same selective omission of any 
reference to the Ground Lease occurs with Wolfs paraphrasing of its Fourth, Sixth and 
Seventh Causes of Action. (R. 760-66). 
The Trial Court Never Ruled that the SPA Agreement Arbitration Provision 
Applied to Any Claims in This Lawsuit 
In a pretextual effort to excuse its untimely Motion to Compel Arbitration, Wolf 
continues to assert that in denying Wolfs Motion for Leave to add the eleven parties, the 
trial court ruled that Wolfs claims were subject to arbitration under the SPA Agreement. 
See Wolfs Brief at 13-14. Wolf is attempting to blame the trial court for its failure to 
request arbitration at an earlier date. Wolfs efforts in this respect are in direct conflict 
with the plain language of the trial court's rulings. 
In its Ruling and Order denying Wolfs initial Motion to Stay, the trial court 
specifically addressed Wolfs mistaken logic on this issue: 
At oral argument Wolf in essence ''blamed" this court for its untimely 
motion to compel arbitration. Wolf argued that it did not believe, prior to 
April 29, 2009, that Wolf had claims that could be arbitrated, and that the 
SPA Agreement did not require Wolf to arbitrate. Then, Wolf argues, on 
April 29, 2009, this court said Wolf must arbitrate and only then did Wolf 
know it could arbitrate and it quickly moved to compel. 
This court rejects that argument as a basis for Wolfs claim that it did not 
waive arbitration because it did not know until then that it could arbitrate. 
Whatever the SPA Agreement says, Wolf was aware of it fully long before 
April 29, 2009. If Wolf did not believe it could arbitrate under that 
agreement, it evidently acted on that basis. If Wolf believed it could 
arbitrate under that Agreement, it should have moved to compel long ago. 
This court did NOT rule on April 29, 2009, that Wolf MUST or COULD or 
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SHOULD arbitrate.... Whatever the SPA Agreement requires, Wolf was 
entitled to have its own opinion and could have claimed its "right" to 
arbitrate. This Court did NOT rule that Wolf had a right to arbitrate. 
(R. 4560-61) (emphasis in original). Thus, the trial court never ruled that any claims 
were subject to arbitration. Rather, the trial court determined that for several years Wolf 
sat on any rights it may have had both with respect to adding the eleven other landowners 
as third parties three years into the litigation, and seeking arbitration after having 
substantially participated in litigation. (R. 3065-87, see esp. 3082 and 4546-66, see esp. 
4561). The only issue on appeal to this Court is whether the trial court properly found 
that Wolf waived any potential contractual right to arbitrate. As stated by the trial court: 
An appeal will determine whether, and ONLY whether, this court erred in 
concluding there has been a waiver of arbitration. If the appellate court 
determines there has been no waiver, it still remains for the court on 
remand to determine if arbitration must occur and what claims are 
arbitrable. 
(R. 4546-66, see esp. 4563) (R. 4556) ("Even if this court is reversed and the appellate 
court rules there was no waiver, there will be a remand to this court for a further 
determination as to whether indeed arbitration should occur and on what issues."). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court denied Wolfs Motion to Compel Arbitration on the grounds that 
Wolf waived any potential arbitration right, finding that (i) Wolf substantially 
participated in the litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate, and (ii) the 
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ASC Parties have been prejudiced by Wolfs failure to demand arbitration in a timely 
manner. (R. 4005-4036). 
In making its ruling, the trial court applied the two-prong test for waiver of the 
right to arbitrate that this Court adopted in Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 
833 P.2d 356 (Utah 1992). According to Chandler, a party can waive its right to 
arbitration "based on both a finding of participation in litigation to a point inconsistent 
with the intent to arbitrate and a finding of prejudice." Id. at 360. Over the last 17 years, 
this Court has reaffirmed Chandler on numerous occasions and Utah courts have applied 
the two-prong test adopted therein to determine if a party has waived its contractual right 
to arbitrate. See infra Section LA. The trial court's decision is in complete conformity to 
this established law. 
Wolf raises several meritless arguments in an effort to dodge the effect of its 
failure to request arbitration in a timely manner. First, Wolf argues that it did not 
intentionally relinquish a known right to arbitration. See Wolfs Brief at 23. However, 
Wolf is deemed to have knowledge of its contractual rights and it cannot hide behind its 
deliberate choice to interpret the SPA Agreement arbitration provision—of which it 
indisputably was aware-as not applying to the claims in this litigation, but attempt a full 
about face from this position when Wolf belatedly determines a strategic advantage for 
doing so. 
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Second, Wolf argues that its actions do not satisfy the two-prong test for waiver. 
See Wolfs Brief at 29-33. To the contrary, there is ample evidence in the record to 
support the trial court's factual determination that Wolf substantially participated in the 
litigation and that the ASC Parties have been prejudiced by Wolfs failure to demand 
arbitration in a timely manner. Wolfs arguments to the contrary rely upon an overly 
simplistic, self-serving view of the facts of this case. 
Third, in a last ditch effort to avoid the consequences of its actions over the last 
three years, Wolf argues that arbitration is a mandatory, statutory right that cannot ever 
be waived. In making this argument, Wolf is asking this Court to overturn Chandler and 
its numerous progeny, all of which were decisions rendered after the enactment of the 
Utah Arbitration Act ("the "Act"). See Wolfs Brief at 34-49. This argument is fatally 
flawed for a number of reasons. Wolf has not satisfied the substantial burden of 
persuasion necessary to overturn seventeen years of precedent that has applied the 
equitable doctrine of waiver in the context of the Act. Moreover, the right to arbitration 
is a contractual right and does not derive from the Act. The Act is a procedural statute 
that sets forth a framework for implementation of arbitration if the parties have an 
agreement to arbitrate; it does not establish a mandatory or jurisdictional right to 
arbitration. The statute expressly preserves the rights of parties to assert equitable 
defenses even if an agreement to arbitrate exists. The Act does not abrogate the equitable 
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principle of waiver. Therefore, the authority cited by Wolf relating to mandatory7, 
statutory rights is not relevant to this appeal. 
Additionally, this Court's decision in Chandler and its progeny is completely 
consistent with state and federal case law regarding waiver of the right to arbitrate, in the 
context of statutes similar to the Act. Wolf has failed to cite a single decision holding 
that the right to arbitrate is nonwaivable. Finally, public policy would best be served by 
allowing the parties to move forward with the litigation that has been ongoing for the last 
three years. 
Accordingly, the Court should affirm the trial court's ruling that Wolf waived any 
potential right that it might have had to arbitration and remand this case forthwith to the 
trial court for further proceedings consistent with that ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT WOLF WAIVED 
ANY POTENTIAL RIGHT THAT IT MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE HAD 
TO COMPEL ARBITRATION BY SUBSTANTIALLY PARTICIPATING 
IN THIS LITIGATION. 
A. The Trial Court Applied the Proper Framework for Determining 
Whether a Party Has Waived a Right to Arbitration, 
Nearly two decades ago, in Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 
356, 360 (Utah 1992), this Court unequivocally ruled that although public policy favors 
arbitration, '"it is not the policy of this court to allow a party to suffer prejudice because 
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an opposing party has failed to timely assert a contractual right.*'5 Thus, the Court held 
that a party can waive its right to arbitration "based on both a finding of participation in 
litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate and a finding of prejudice." 
Id. 
Since its seminal decision in Chandler, the Utah Supreme Court has reaffirmed 
this two prong test on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Cent. Florida Inv., 2002 UT 3, ^ 
22, 40 P.3d 599 ("Waiver of a right to arbitration occurs when: [1] the party seeking 
arbitration substantially participates in litigation, to a point inconsistent with the intent to 
arbitrate, and [2] this participation results in prejudice to the opposing party."); Cedar 
Surgery Ctr., LLC v. Bonelli, 2004 UT 58, \ 14, 96 P.3d 911 ("the party alleging waiver 
must demonstrate (1) that the party seeking arbitration substantially participated in the 
underlying litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate; and (2) that this 
participation resulted in prejudice to the opposing party."); Baker v. Stevens, 2005 UT 32, 
113, 114 P.3d 580 ("We have constructed a two-part test for determining whether a party 
has waived its right to arbitrate by participating in litigation . . . ."); Pledger v. Gillespie, 
1999 UT 54, ^ 19, 982 P.2d 572 ("In Chandler, we set forth the two-pronged standard for 
determining whether a party has waived a contractual right of arbitration "). The 
5
 Although this Court has recognized that public policy favors arbitration, it adopted the 
two-prong Chandler test to determine if a party has waived its contractual right to 
arbitrate. The Chandler test balances the policy considerations favoring arbitration in 
light of the substantial prejudice that can result from a party's failure to timely exercise 
that contractual right. See infra Section II.D. 
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Utah Court of Appeals has also applied this test in cases involving waiver of the right to 
arbitrate. See, e.g., Smile Inc. Asia Pte. Ltd. v. BriteSmile Mgmt., Inc., 2005 UT App 381, 
Tf 22, 122 P.3d 654; Am. Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Sys. Communication Corp., 939 P.2d 185, 
192 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
This two-pronged test initially set forth in Chandler, which has been followed 
consistently for seventeen years, is the precise framework that the trial court properly 
applied. Thus, the only decision left for this Court to determine is whether Wolf has 
demonstrated that the trial court's findings that Wolf substantially participated in this 
litigation and the ASC Parties were prejudiced are against the clear weight of evidence, 
or are clearly erroneous. 
B. Because Wolf Has Failed to Marshal the Evidence, this Court Need Not 
Consider Wolfs Challenge to the Sufficiency of the Trial Court's 
Findings of Substantial Participation and Prejudice. 
Wolf bears the burden of marshalling the evidence in support of the trial court's 
factual findings, and then demonstrating that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are ";so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of evidence.'" 
Cache County v. Beus% 2005 UT App 503, \ 6, 128 P.3d 63 (citation omitted). "Where 
an appellant challenges a trial court's findings, that appellant must 'marshal all the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that even viewing it 
in the light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the 
findings.'" Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, % 17, 20 P.3d 332 (Utah 2001) (quoting 
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Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985)). If the appellant fails to marshal 
the evidence, this Court need not consider the challenge to the sufficiency of the findings. 
See id. Because Wolf has not even attempted to marshal the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings of substantial participation and prejudice, this Court assumes that 
the findings are adequately supported by the evidence. See Cache County, 2005 UT App 
503,f 6,128P.3d63. 
Instead of marshalling the evidence, Wolf incredibly downplays its extensive 
participation in the litigation by arguing that its "participation in primarily fact discovery 
was reasonable under the circumstances and does not give rise to an inference of waiver." 
Wolfs Brief at 31. Nothing could be further from the truth. This statement is belied by 
the lengthy case history, as noted above and by the trial court. See Supra at 11-12; (R. 1-
4705, see esp. 4559) ("The court believed and continues to believe, or assumes, that the 
long, long (44 volumes at this moment, a docket over 70 pages) history of this case is 
inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate and thus arbitration has been waived.") 
Likewise, Wolf only addressed one of several bases for a finding of prejudice. See 
infra Section I.D. Simply put, Wolf failed to properly marshal the evidence, much less 
demonstrate the evidence is so lacking as to render the trial court's findings clearly 
erroneous. To the contrary, the record overwhelmingly shows that Wolf substantially 
participated in this litigation and the ASC Parties were prejudiced by Wolfs choice to 
raise the issue of arbitration almost three years after this litigation began. 
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C. Over the Last Three Years, Wolf Has Substantially Participated in the 
Litigation, 
The first prong of the Chandler test is whether the party seeking arbitration 
substantially participated in the litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to 
arbitrate. This prong requires "a court to look at the actions of the party seeking 
arbitration, and to determine 'whether those actions evidence an intent to submit to the 
jurisdiction of the court and pursue redress through litigation.'" Cedar Surgery Ctr., 
2004 UT 58, K 16, 96 P.3d 911 (citation omitted). This Court has discussed the level of 
participation in litigation that will result in a waiver of the right to arbitrate: 
Participation in discovery and other aspects of litigation that do not 
necessarily involve the court are factors we consider in trying to ascertain a 
party's intent or attitude toward its participation in litigation. Requests 
made of the court by the parties, however, have even greater weight. We 
consider especially important whether the parties' requests of the court 
demonstrate an intent to pursue litigation or whether they demonstrate an 
intent to avoid litigation and a desire to be sent to arbitrate. Accordingly, 
parties seeking to enforce arbitration should ensure that the court, not just 
the opposing party, is informed that arbitration is desired. In doing so, 
judicial resources will be appropriately conserved. 
Cent. Florida Inv., 2002 UT 3, <h 26, 40 P.3d 599. 
In Chandler, the Utah Supreme Court held that Blue Cross participated in the 
litigation to a point inconsistent with arbitration based upon the following evidence in the 
record: 
Before Blue Cross moved to compel arbitration, it filed an answer, filed a 
cross-claim, participated in discovery for five months, and reviewed the 
discovery that had already taken place prior to its entrance into the case. 
These actions clearly manifest an intent to proceed to trial. 
25 
Chandler, 833 P.2d at 360. 
The first prong of the Chandler test is easily satisfied in this case. ASCU filed its 
FAC in July 2006. Rather than immediately moving to compel arbitration, Wolf filed a 
motion to dismiss, and after that was denied, filed its own separate lawsuit, now 
consolidated herein, an answer and a counterclaim. Significantly, Wolf failed to raise the 
right to arbitrate as grounds for dismissal in its September 2006 Motion to Dismiss, or as 
an affirmative defense. Moreover, Wolf intentionally chose to litigate, not arbitrate, 
claims against ASCU that Wolf argues arise under the SPA Agreement. Over the last 
three years, Wolf has litigated the case (and extensively so) in the trial court. It has 
participated in broad discovery and filed and defended a host of motions. See Supra at 
11-13. 
In an effort to justify its extensive participation in this litigation, Wolf cites to 
Cent Florida Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Assoc, 2002 UT 3, 40 P.3d 599, to argue that 
it was compelled to participate by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Regrettably for 
Wolf, its actions bear no resemblance to the actions of the party seeking to avoid waiver 
in the Central Florida case. In Central Florida, the prospective purchaser of land 
("CFF) brought suit against the seller (CTWAV) after the parties' deal fell apart prior to 
closing. Three days after CFI filed its complaint, PWA's counsel sent CFFs counsel a 
letter indicating that any dispute under the parties' purchase contract was subject to 
arbitration. See id. at ^ 3. Additionally, at the same time PWA filed its answer, it also 
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filed a counterclaim raising the issue of arbitration. See id. at 15. Finally, the same day 
PWA filed its answer and counterclaim, it also filed a motion to dismiss, again raising the 
issue of arbitration. See id. at \ 6. Four months after the complaint was filed, and just 
four days after the district court entered an order denying in part PWA's motion to 
dismiss, PWA filed a motion to compel arbitration. See id. at ^ [ 8-9. The district court 
denied PWA's motion to compel arbitration. See id. at \ 9. 
On appeal, this Court reversed the decision of the district court, specifically 
finding that "PWA did not waive its right to arbitrate because PWA did not participate in 
litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate." Id. at Yf 36-37. In reaching 
this conclusion, the Court noted that PWA expressed its desire to arbitrate early and 
often, and that it was an unwilling participant in the litigation: 
In sum, although PWA participated in the litigation process in this case, it 
did so reluctantly, demonstrating a sufficient intent to arbitrate. PWA 
communicated to CFI and the district court that its participation in litigation 
was reluctant and that it wished to arbitrate. PWA clearly expressed to CFI 
in the November 12,1999 letter that it wished to arbitrate, and PWA also 
conveyed to the court, albeit not as clearly as it could have, that it wished to 
arbitrate in its counterclaim, and memorandum in support of its motion to 
dismiss. Significantly, the litigation machinery was not invoked by PWA, 
and when it did participate in the litigation process, it did so while 
communicating an intent to arbitrate. Because PWA conveyed its intent to 
arbitrate to the court (in its pleadings) and to CFI (in both a letter and in its 
pleadings), PWA's participation in litigation, while not minimal, did not 
demonstrate an intent to no longer arbitrate. 
A/, at 134. 
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In stark contrast, Wolf did not express its desire to arbitrate early or often in this 
case. Rather, it actively and willingly participated in the litigation for nearly three years 
before requesting arbitration for the first time in May 2009. Wolf did not raise the issue 
of arbitration under the SPA Agreement provision in its September 2006 Motion to 
Dismiss, although it did argue other defenses related to the SPA Agreement, including 
that the other signatories to the SPA Agreement were indispensable parties and that 
ASCU could not seek to "enforce the SPA Agreement" because of the statute of 
limitations. 
Since the fall of 2006, Wolf has engaged in extensive discovery, with the 
exchange of voluminous written discovery, including: 1) more than 400 separate 
Requests for Production propounded by Wolf to the ASC Parties; 2) the production of 
more than 150,000 pages of documents by the ASC Parties in response to those; 3) the 
service of two sets of interrogatories, with almost 50 separate queries, upon the ASC 
Parties by Wolf; 4) the service of two sets of Requests for Admission, containing another 
45 queries, to the ASC Parties; 5) Wolfs issuance of numerous subpoenas duces tecum; 
and 6) the taking of over 32 depositions, 16 of which Wolf noticed and initiated. See 
Supra at 11-12. 
The trial court has heard and ruled upon numerous motions, many of which were 
filed by Wolf. For instance, Wolf has filed a motion to dismiss, a stipulated motion for 
case management order, a motion to compel responses to written discovery requests, a 
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motion for an order increasing the bond posted by ASCU for preliminary injunction, 
motions relating to various scheduling issues, a motion to amend the case management 
order, motions to compel depositions, and motions to compel responses to subpoenas. 
During the course of the litigation, ASCU filed two separate motions for summary 
judgment, both of which were postponed after Wolf sought Rule 56(f) relief. The trial 
court has extended the discovery schedule with Wolfs input on two occasions, and the 
last order from September 2008 held that fact discovery was to be completed by July 1, 
2009. 
Based upon these facts, the trial court properly determined that Wolfs actions 
demonstrated an intent to submit to the jurisdiction of the court and to pursue redress 
through litigation rather than arbitration: 
Wolf has extensively litigated this case over the past three years. A brief 
review of the docket for these consolidated cases shows that Wolf has taken 
actions inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate by conducting discovery for 
about three years, taking and defending numerous depositions, and 
extensive motion practice, similar to what occurred in Smile Inc. Asia. The 
case now as of this date consumes 37 volumes, growing daily. Unlike what 
occurred in Central Florida Investments, Wolf has failed to ensure that the 
court and parties were aware of its intent to seek arbitration. Therefore, 
Wolfs actions during the past three years regarding these consolidated 
cases have demonstrated its willingness to engage in litigation to a point 
inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. 
(R. 4005-4036, see esp. 4031). In the end, Wolf simply waited too long to demand 
arbitration: 
Given the lengthy history of the case, over three years into litigation, the 
court does believe that Wolf has, as one case put it, tested the judicial 
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waters and found them to be bitter and is thus seeking arbitration. This 
court has simply ruled Wolf is too late and waived its right to do so. 
(R. 4546-66, see esp. 4562) (emphasis added). 
These findings are supported by the record in this case and are not against the 
clear weight of evidence. Consequently, the trial court's finding that Wolf substantially 
participated in litigation to the point inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate should be 
upheld. 
D. The ASC Parties Have Been Prejudiced by Wolfs Substantial 
Participation in this Litigation and Its Failure to Timely Demand 
Arbitration. 
The second prong of the Chandler test is whether Wolfs participation in the 
litigation results in prejudice to the opposing parties. It is widely held that: 
[prejudice that will support a finding of waiver of the right to arbitrate may be 
variously shown. It may be shown where the party seeking to compel arbitration 
engages in discovery proceedings not available in arbitration, causes extensive or 
unreasonable expenses or delay by delaying the invocation of arbitration 
proceedings, or makes motions going to the merits of an adversary's claims. It 
may also be shown from lost evidence or duplication of efforts. 
33 C.J.S. Exchanges § 50 (2009). 
In Chandler, the Utah Supreme Court identified several examples of prejudice that 
would support a finding of waiver: 
[Tjhere is general agreement concerning the prejudicial nature of certain 
factual situations. Courts have recognized that prejudice can occur if a 
party gains an advantage in arbitration through participation in pretrial 
procedures. Courts have also stated that prejudice exists when the party 
seeking arbitration is attempting to forum-shop after '"the judicial waters 
[have].. . been tested." In addition, prejudice has been found in situations 
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where the party seeking arbitration allows the opposing party to undergo 
the types of expenses that arbitration is designed to alleviate, such as the 
expense of preparing to argue important pretrial motions or the expense of 
conducting discovery procedures that are not available in arbitration. The 
finding of prejudice, however, has never been linked to any specific type of 
harm. 
Chandler, 833 P.2d at 359. In Baker v Stevens, 2005 UT 32, 114 P.3d 580, this Court 
held that because the plaintiff incurred expenses that she would have avoided had the 
defendant "confined his efforts to arbitration," she suffered prejudice. Id. at \ 16. As 
noted in Chandler, "any real detriment is sufficient to support a finding of prejudice." 
Chandler, 833 P.2d at 360 (emphasis added). 
The ASC Parties have clearly been prejudiced by Wolfs failure to request 
arbitration in a timely manner and its extensive participation in this litigation. Wolf has 
participated in broad ranging discovery and motion practice that would not have been 
available in arbitration. Wolfs actions have also allowed it to obtain information for 
arbitration that it would not otherwise have but for the voluminous discovery in this case. 
Also, Wolf itself has stated, although some of that discovery could be used in a potential 
arbitration proceeding, much of it would likely have to be redone, because Wolf has 
included nine other landowners in its demand for arbitration, and they have not 
participated in discovery in this case. See Wolfs Response to ASC Parties' Rule 8 A 
Petition for Emergency Relief at 3, 8, and 12. Moreover, Wolf has asserted its claims in 
this litigation against third parties who are not signatories to the SPA Agreement, and 
thus, are not subject to its provisions, to wit. ASC, Leslie Otten and Blaise Carrig. Wolf 
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recognized this, and did not name these parties in the arbitration demand. As such, there 
are neither efficiencies nor conservation of judicial resources to be achieved by 
compelling arbitration at this late juncture. Instead, to allow arbitration at this late date 
would result in nothing but inefficient duplication of efforts, unnecessary expense and 
delay. Finally, the Court should not allow Wolf to forum shop its claims after it has had 
three years to "test the judicial waters." While any one of these bases is sufficient alone 
to support a finding of prejudice, when viewed in their totality there is no doubt that the 
ASC Parties have been prejudiced by Wolfs untimely arbitration demand. 
The trial court cited many of these factors in its Ruling and Order denying Wolfs 
Motion to Compel Arbitration: 
The ASC Parties point to Wolfs participation in broad discovery and 
motion practice that would not have been available in arbitration as 
evidence that the ASC Parties have been prejudiced by Wolfs failure to 
request arbitration in a timely manner. Additionally, the parties have spent 
three years undertaking most of the expense necessary to complete 
discovery and prepare for trial. There has been an enormous push with 
countless depositions, local and in several states, occurring during the 
months of May and June, to end within days of this ruling. The ASC 
Parties argue, especially when considering that Wolf has asserted claims in 
this litigation against third parties that are not signatories to the SPA 
Agreement in addition to the extensive discovery and motion practice, that 
it is too late to consider efficiency and conservation of resources. Thus, the 
policies favoring arbitration are defeated and the ASC Parties have been 
prejudiced. Because Wolf feels that it did not intend to, and was thus 
incapable of waiving its rights to arbitration under the SPA Agreement, it 
did not refute the ASC Parties' claims that it has been prejudiced by Wolfs 
delay in asserting its right to arbitration. Hence when looking at the extent 
of discovery and motion practice that has occurred over the past three years 
and the expense of this litigation to the parties to this point, the court finds 
32 
and concludes that the ASC Parties have been prejudiced by Wolfs late 
assertion of its right to arbitrate under the SPA Agreement. 
(R. 40054036, see esp. 4032-33) (emphasis added). 
In an effort to minimize the substantial prejudice resulting from its decision to 
actively pursue litigation for three years before demanding arbitration, Wolf argues that 
its actions did not result in prejudice to ASCU because the extensive fact discovery that 
has been conducted also relates to the nonarbitrable claims. In fact, Wolf spends nearly 
two and a half pages in its brief arguing that discovery conducted to date also relates to 
those nonarbitrable claims that will be litigated.6 See Wolfs Brief at 31-33. 
Wolf cites to the Chandler decision for the proposition that "no prejudice results if 
the discovery relates to nonarbitrable claims which will be severed and separately 
litigated." Id. at 359 n.17. The discovery conducted to date, however, has not been, and 
is not able to be, severed and separated between those claims that Wolf defines as being 
"SPA claims" and those that are not. Thus, contrary to the circumstances in Chandler, 
6
 Throughout its brief, Wolf repeatedly refers to a "pending supplemental index" to 
support its arguments. See, e.g., Wolfs Brief at 15,17-19 and 32. These citations 
apparently refer to pleadings and transcripts that were not included in the record on 
appeal and which occurred months after the trial court entered its decision denying 
Wolfs Motion to Compel Arbitration. Not only are these matters irrelevant to the 
pending appeal, but they violate Rule 24(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
which requires citation to "the pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 
11(b)." This is particularly true given that Wolf has not moved to supplement or modify 
the record. Therefore, the Court should disregard Wolfs arguments that are not properly 
supported by the actual record on appeal. 
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the discovery has been and continues to be conducted on more than just the alleged 
nonarbitrable claims. 
Moreover, while the ASC Parties have certainly been prejudiced by the 
voluminous discovery in this case that would not have been allowed to the same extent in 
arbitration, their prejudice is not limited solely to expense associated with such discovery. 
Wolfs argument is misleadingly myopic and flatly ignores the numerous grounds 
supporting the trial court's finding of prejudice. Consequently, the trial court's findings 
were not clearly erroneous and should be upheld. 
E. Wolf Alone Is Responsible for Wolfs Failure to Demand Arbitration at 
an Earlier Date. 
1. Wolf cannot hide behind its chosen interpretation of the SPA 
Agreement. 
In yet another groundless effort to excuse its untimely Motion to Compel 
Arbitration, Wolf argues that it did not initially believe that its claims were subject to 
arbitration under the SPA Agreement. See, e.g., Wolfs Brief at 24-26. Wolf admittedly 
was aware of the arbitration provision in the SPA Agreement, but simply chose not to 
pursue arbitration under it. It was only after the trial court denied Wolfs extremely 
untimely attempt to add eleven third parties in an effort to derail this litigation that Wolf 
changed its tune and decided that arbitration would be a better forum to pursue. Given 
that Wolf filed the Motion to Compel Arbitration on the heels of trying to add eleven new 
parties, with less than six weeks remaining in the fact discovery period, after having 
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argued almost three years earlier that those parties were indispensable, while 
simultaneously scrambling to seek additional time to conduct discovery (which attempt 
was also denied as untimely)-Wolf s motives appear clear. 
In its Ruling and Order denying Wolfs Motion to Stay, the trial court specifically 
addressed Wolfs mistaken logic on this issue: 
At oral argument Wolf in essence "blamed" this court for its untimely 
motion to compel arbitration. Wolf argued that it did not believe, prior to 
April 29, 2009, that Wolf had claims that could be arbitrated, and that the 
SPA Agreement did not require Wolf to arbitrate. Then, Wolf argues, on 
April 29, 2009, this court said Wolf must arbitrate and only then did Wolf 
know it could arbitrate and it quickly moved to compel. 
This court rejects that argument as a basis for Wolfs claim that it did not 
waive arbitration because it did not know until then that it could arbitrate. 
Whatever the SPA Agreement says, Wolf was aware of it fully long before 
April 29, 2009. If Wolf did not believe it could arbitrate under that 
agreement, it evidently acted on that basis. If Wolf believed it could 
arbitrate under that Agreement, it should have moved to compel long ago. 
This court did NOT rule on April 29, 2009, that Wolf MUST or COULD or 
SHOULD arbitrate. . . . Whatever the SPA Agreement requires, Wolf was 
entitled to have its own opinion and could have claimed its "right" to 
arbitrate. This Court did NOT rule that Wolf had a right to arbitrate. 
(R. 4546-66, see esp. 4560-61) (emphasis in original). 
As explained by the trial court, Wolf was aware of the arbitration provision in the 
SPA Agreement long before April 29, 2009. In fact, Wolf is deemed to have knowledge 
of the various provisions in the SPA Agreement as of November 1999. See Thews v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 407 P.2d 685, 688 (Utah 1965) ('It is also the majority rule 
that an insured is under a duty to read his application before signing it, and will be 
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considered bound by a knowledge of the contents of his signed application. This is 
merely an application of fundamental contract law."); John Call Engineering, Inc. v. 
Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1208 (Utah 1987) ("a party is bound by the contract 
which he or she voluntarily and knowingly signs"). Each party has the burden to 
understand the terms of the contract they sign and cannot thereafter assert "ignorance as a 
defense." Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1047 (Utah 
1985). A party is "obligated to take reasonable steps to inform himself, and to protect his 
own interests." Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture Co., 770 
P.2d 88, 93 (Utah 1988). 
Wolf could have, but chose not to, raise the issue of arbitration back in September 
2006 when it filed its Motion to Dismiss. Notably, that motion included other arguments 
with respect to the SPA Agreement. Instead, Wolf chose to participate in litigation, and 
even argued in its Motion to Dismiss that the other SPA Agreement signatories were 
indispensable parties, but did not make any effort to join them until almost three years 
later. The only reason that Wolf has now "seen the error of its ways" in how it formerly 
interpreted the SPA Agreement is because its March 2009 attempt to add the other 
landowners was denied as untimely and in violation of Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. If Wolf had wanted to join the other landowners, it should have attempted to 
do so in 2006. Likewise, if Wolf had wanted to compel any of these claims into 
arbitration, it should have attempted to do so in 2006. 
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Wolf cannot sit back for three years and wait for a tribunal to interpret its potential 
contractual rights. If Wolf had intended to seek arbitration, it should have and could have 
moved to compel arbitration in 2006 to protect its interests. By doing so, Wolf could 
have in a timely fashion tested the waters as to whether or not the trial court believed any 
of the claims in this case were subject to arbitration under the SPA Agreement. By not 
doing so, Wolf intentionally chose not to pursue arbitration. Wolfs blaming the trial 
court for belatedly making the remark in clear dictum as justification for Wolfs tardiness 
in pursuing arbitration is unavailing. 
2. Wolfs intent to relinquish any potential contractual right to 
arbitrate can be inferred. 
Under the clear legal standards set forth by this Court in Chandler and its progeny, 
Wolf has waived any right that it might have had to compel arbitration. See supra 
Section LA. In an effort to circumvent this substantial body of law, Wolf argues that it 
was not an intentional waiver because, during the three years this litigation proceeded, it 
chose to interpret the SPA Agreement arbitration provision differently than it does now. 
First, contrary to Wolfs repeated unsupported assertions, the trial court has not held that 
any claims in this litigation are subject to arbitration under the SPA Agreement. See 
supra at 17-18. Moreover, the trial court* s line of dicta referencing Wolfs desired claims 
against the putative third party defendants does not compel the conclusion that any of 
ASCtTs or Wolfs claims are subject to arbitration. Wolf was not, therefore, somehow 
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forced to bring a motion to compel arbitration. It tactically chose to do so after getting 
the idea from the trial court's line of dicta. 
Second, Wolf misunderstands the meaning of waiver in the context of this case. 
Although waiver may be generally defined as the "intentional relinquishment of a known 
right," intent is inferred from a party's actions: 
Consistent with our general waiver jurisprudence, see Soter's, Inc. v. 
DeseretFed. Sav. &LoanAss'n, 857 P.2d 935, 939-40 (Utah 1993) 
(defining waiver as "the intentional relinquishment of a known right"), we 
have held that a "waiver of the right to arbitrate must be intentional," and a 
court may infer waiver "only if the facts demonstrate that the party seeking 
to enforce arbitration intended to disregard its right to arbitrate." Cent. 
Fla., 2002 UT 3 at f 24, 40 P.3d 599. Hence, for a court to find that a party 
has waived its arbitration right, the party alleging waiver must demonstrate 
(1) that the party seeking arbitration substantially participated in the 
underlying litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate; and 
(2) that this participation resulted in prejudice to the opposing party. 
Chandler, 833 P.2d at 360; Cent. Fla., 2002 UT 3 at fflf 22, 24, 40 P.3d 599. 
Cedar Surgery Or., 2004 UT 5 8 4 19, 96 P.3d 911. The two-prong Chandler test is the 
standard by which Utah courts determine whether a party intentionally waived its right to 
arbitrate. As aforementioned, the trial court correctly applied this test, and its findings 
that: 1) Wolf substantially participated in litigation inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate; 
and 2) the ASC Parties are prejudiced by Wolfs untimely demand to compel arbitration, 
are not against the clear weight of the evidence. As a result, Wolf has waived any 
potential right that it might have had to compel arbitration. 
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n. WOLF HAS NOT SATISFIED THE SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN OF 
PERSUASION INVOLVED IN ASKING THIS COURT TO ABROGATE 
ITS PRIOR DECISIONS IN CHANDLER AND ITS PROGENY. 
A. Wolf Must Satisfy a Substantial Burden of Persuasion in Asking This 
Court to Overturn Its Prior Precedent. 
"[Precedent should not be overruled lightly." State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 427 
(Utah 1996). This Court has explained that long standing precedent "should not be 
overruled except for the most compelling of reasons." Wilson v. Manning, 657 P.2d 251, 
254 (Utah 1982). Any party asking the Court "to overturn prior precedent ha[s] a 
substantial burden of persuasion. This burden is mandated by the doctrine of stare 
decisis." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994) (internal citation omitted); 
accord City ofHildale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56, f 36, 28 P.3d 697 (referencing "the high 
bar required to override stare decisis."). 
The doctrine of stare decisis, "under which the first decision by a court on a 
particular question of law governs later decisions by the same court, is a cornerstone of 
Anglo-American jurisprudence that is crucial to the predictability of the law and the 
fairness of adjudication. The very viability of the common law depends in large part on 
the doctrine. '[N]° judicial system could do society's work if it eyed each issue afresh in 
every case that raised it.'" State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993) (quoting 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992)) (internal citation omitted). 
Under this doctrine, "a court is not inexorably bound by its own precedents but 
will follow the rule of law which it has established in earlier cases, unless clearly 
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convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of 
changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing from 
precedent." Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399; accord City offfildale, 2001 UT 56, \ 36, 28 P.3d 
697 ("Specifically, parties seeking to have us depart from our prior case law must 'clearly 
convince[ ] [us] that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of 
changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing from 
precedent.'") (citations omitted); Tindley v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 2005 UT 30, f 
16, 116 P.3d 295 ("Because the District has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating 
either that Berry was erroneously decided or that a change in conditions now makes its 
holding unsound, we decline its invitation to overrule Berry"'), 
Without even trying to argue an alleged change in condition, Wolf boldly asks this 
Court to overrule Chandler and seventeen years of case law that has consistently applied 
the equitable doctrine of waiver to arbitration agreements. See Chandler, 833 P.2d at 
360; supra Section LA. It is also important to note that Chandler and the subsequent 
cases applying the two-pronged waiver test, all were rendered after the Utah Arbitration 
Act was adopted in 1985. The alleged statutory "mandatory" language argued by Wolf 
as being jurisdictional did not preclude the seventeen years of cases from applying waiver 
and holding otherwise. 
Chandler is also entirely consistent with a legion of case law from other 
jurisdictions, both state and federal. Wolf has not provided any valid reason why 
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Chandler should be overruled. To the contrary, Wolf has failed to identify any specific 
case law, either from Utah or other jurisdictions, which supports its meritless theory that 
arbitration is mandatory, jurisdictional and cannot be waived. Chandler and the 
seventeen years of subsequent case law should not be overturned, and Wolfs appeal 
should be denied forthwith so that this case, now over three years old, can move forward 
to trial. 
B. Arbitration is a Contractual Right and, Thus, Is Not Mandatory and 
Jurisdictional. 
Utah courts as well as numerous courts throughout the country have held that the 
right to arbitration is a right based in contract. See, e.g., Chandler, 833 P.2d at 360 
(describing the right to arbitration as a "contractual right."); Cent. Florida Inv., 2002 UT 
3, \ 22, 40 P.3d 599 (same). Wolfs entire nonwaivability argument is premised on the 
incorrect assumption that the right to arbitration springs from statute not contract. As 
7
 There is no shortage of decisions holding that the right to arbitration is a contractual 
right. See, e.g., Shahan v. Brinegar, 390 N.E. 2d 1036, 1041 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) 
(holding that the "right to require . . . arbitration, as in the case of other contractual 
matters, may be waived by the parties where they fail to request arbitration"); Dufrene v. 
HBOS Mfg., 872 So. 2d 1206,1211 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (explaining that despite statutory 
provision that arbitration agreement is "irrevocable, a party's conduct can effect a waiver 
of its contractual right to demand arbitration"); Home Gas Corp. of Mass., Inc. v. 
Walter's ofHadley, Inc., 532 N.E. 2d 681, 683 (Mass. 1989) ("The right to arbitration 
may be lost, as any contractual right which exists in favor of a party may be lost through 
a failure properly and timely to assert the right.") (quotations and citation omitted); 
Interconex, Inc. v. Ugarov, 224 S.W.3d 523, 533 (Tex. App. 2007) ("As with any 
contractual right, a party may waive its right to arbitration."). 
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such, Wolfs lengthy argument regarding mandatory statutory rights is inapposite and 
should not distract this Court from its own well established precedent. 
In fact, as this Court has recognized, the Utah Arbitration Act (the "Act") 
expressly preserves the ability of a court to employ its powers of equity. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3 la-3 (1999) (stating court may find an arbitration agreement is not 
enforceable upon any "grounds existing at law or equity") (emphasis added); see also 
Pledger v Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, ffl[ 14-15, 982 P.2d 572 (highlighting language in Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3 la-3 in applying waiver analysis); Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 
801 (Utah 1998) (applying equitable doctrine of part performance to an agreement to 
arbitrate); Sosa v. Pernios, 924 P.2d 357, 362-65 (Utah 1996) (applying the equitable 
doctrine of unconscionability to an agreement to arbitrate). Thus, the well established 
equitable doctrine of waiver is expressly allowed by the Act. This Court has also 
specifically held that equitable contract principles were not abrogated by the Act. 
For instance, in Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P. 2d 796 (Utah 1998), this Court held 
that the equitable contract principle of part performance could be employed to enforce an 
oral arbitration agreement even though the Act required an arbitration agreement to be in 
writing to be enforceable. See Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 801 (Utah 1998). 
Similarly, in Sosa v. Pernios, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996), this Court held that the equitable 
doctrine of unconscionability could be used to bar enforcement of an agreement to 
arbitrate. See Sosa, 924 P.2d at 362-65; see also Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass 'n v. 
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CR. England, Inc., 325 F. Supp.2d 1252 (D. Utah 2004). If the Utah State Legislature 
had intended to preclude waiver of the right to arbitrate, it easily could have said so. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-4(4) (1999), which actually lists the specific grounds which a 
trial court may not use to abrogate an agreement to arbitrate, makes no mention of 
waiver. See id. ("Refusal to issue an order to arbitrate may not be grounded on a claim 
that an issue subject to arbitration lacks merit, or that fault or grounds for the claim have 
not been shown."). 
While the Act ensures that valid arbitration clauses are enforced by Utah courts, it 
does not abrogate the principle of waiver, nor does it divest Utah courts of jurisdiction to 
determine whether such waiver has occurred. Rather, the Act merely prescribes the 
procedure by which substantive contractual law is enforced. See Powell v. Cannon, 179 
P.3d 799, 801 n.l (Utah 2008) (stating Court has found that Utah Arbitration Act is 
procedural, and not substantive statute). And, as has been repeatedly explained by this 
Court, contractual rights can be waived. See, e.g., Chandler 833 P.2d at 360. Because 
Wolfs alleged right to arbitration is a creature of contract, Wolfs lengthy discussion of 
Utah Constitutional law and mandatory statutory rights is inapplicable and should be 
disregarded by the Court. 
C. Utah Law Regarding Waiver of Right to Arbitration Is Consistent with 
Other State and Federal Precedent on the Issue. 
The version of the Act in effect in 1999, when the SPA Agreement was executed, 
contains similar "shalP language as the Uniform Arbitration Act. See Unif. Arbitration 
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Act (2000) § 7. Utah adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act in 2002. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-11-101 et seq. At least eleven states other than Utah have adopted the 
Uniform Arbitration Act, including some version of Section 7 of the Act. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-11 Ref. and Annos. Despite the purported mandatory "shall" language of 
Section 7 of these arbitration statutes, the courts of all eleven other states hold that the 
right to arbitrate can be waived. 
For example, Colorado Revised Statute § 13-22-207 is based on the Uniform 
Arbitration Act § 7 and contains the same "shall" language emphasized by Wolf. Like 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-4(l) (1999), the Colorado Act instructs that if the court finds 
that there is an enforceable agreement to arbitrate, it "shall order the parties to arbitrate.5' 
Colorado Revised Statute § 13-22-207(2). Despite this language, however, Colorado 
courts have repeatedly and uniformly held that the right to arbitrate can be waived. For 
example, mNorden v. E.F. Button & Co., 739 P.2d 914, 915 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987), the 
Colorado Court of Appeals held that a "defendant's right to arbitrate will be deemed 
waived if he has acted inconsistently with it and prejudice would accrue to the other 
parties." See also Peterman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 961 P.2d 487, 493 (Colo. 
1998) (uJust as with other contractual rights, the right to arbitration can be waived."); 
8
 The "shall" language relied upon by Wolf has been in place since Utah first adopted the 
UtahArbitrationActin 1985. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-31 a-1 and 4(1). Therefore, 
Chandler and each of its progeny were decided against the backdrop of the very statutory 
language that Wolf is now attempting to use to overturn those decisions. 
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Bashor v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 773 P.2d 578, 580 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) 
("Although public policy favors arbitration, a contractual right to arbitrate may 
nevertheless be waived."). 
Every state that has adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act, which contains "shall" 
language similar to that relied upon by Wolf, has held that the right to arbitrate can be 
waived by the conduct of the parties. See, e.g., Victor v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 
795 F. Supp. 300, 302 (D. Alaska 1992); Bashor v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 
113 P.2d 578, 580 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Ass 'n of Owners ofKukui Plaza v. Swinerton & 
Walberg Co., 705 P.2d 28, 36 (Haw. 1985); Nevada Gold & Casinos, Inc. v. Am. 
Heritage, 110 P.3d 481, 485 (Nev. 2005); Wein v. Morris, 944 A.2d 642, 648-649 (N.J. 
2008); United Nuclear Corp. v. Gen. Atomic Co., 597 P.2d 290 (N.M. 1979); 
Servomation Corp. v. Hickory Const. Co., 318 S.E.2d 904, 906 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); 
Dumontv. Saskatchewan Gov. Ins., 258 F.3d 880, 886 (N.D. 2001); Booker v. Sumner, 
19 P.3d 904 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001); Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Hawkins, 964 P.2d 291, 292 (Or. 
Ct. App.1998); and B & D Leasing Co. v. Ager, 748 P.2d 652, 654 (Wash. Ct App. 
1988). Moreover, even among jurisdictions that have not adopted the Uniform 
Arbitration Act, the ASC Parties have not found a single decision supporting Wolfs ill-
founded argument. 
The same theory advocated by Wolf was recently found to be wholly without 
merit by the Supreme Court of Vermont in Lamell Lumber Corp. v. Newstress Int'l Inc. 
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938 A.2d 1215 (Vt 2007). There, the plaintiff, a lumber company, entered into a 
contract with the defendant which provided that "all disputes arising out of the agreement 
shall be decided by arbitration." Id. at 1218. The lumber company filed an action for 
breach of contract, implied warranty and negligence. See id. Although the defendant 
raised the arbitration clause as an affirmative defense in its answer to the complaint, "it 
proceeded to actively litigate the case over the next two years, responding to plaintiffs 
discovery requests and propounding requests of its own, attending depositions and other 
court proceedings, scheduling and canceling mediation, and seeking several continuances 
of the jury draw." Id. at 1218. Finally, more than two years into litigation "the defendant 
filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the arbitration clause in the agreement 
deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction and 'estopped' plaintiff from pursuing its 
claims." Id. The district court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment and 
held that defendant had waived its right to arbitration. Id. at 1219. 
The defendant appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court, raising largely the same 
arguments that Wolf asserts in this appeal. The defendant claimed that the court was 
divested of jurisdiction to find waiver of an agreement to arbitrate because the Vermont 
Arbitration Act stated that the court "shall order the parties to proceed with arbitration" 
and provided that a written arbitration agreement "creates a duty to arbitrate, and is valid, 
enforceable and irrevocable." Id. at 1218-21. The Lamell court found the defendant's 
argument unpersuasive and reasoned that "[a]n arbitration agreement... remains a 
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creature of contract reflecting a voluntary agreement between the parties and as such may 
be waived by the parties." Id. at 1220 (emphasis in original). Therefore, the Vermont 
Supreme Court upheld the decision of the district court that the defendant had waived any 
right to arbitration. 
Vermont is not alone. Jurisdictional claims similar to Wolfs have been uniformly 
rejected by other tribunals as well. See, e.g., Hanslin Builders, Inc. v. BrittDev. Corp., 
445 N.E.2d 188, 190 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) ("It is well settled that a clause providing for 
the resolution by arbitration of disputes arising under an agreement is not jurisdictional, 
and that the parties waive the arbitration clause if. . . they proceed to [litigate] the issues 
in dispute without making a [proper] request for arbitration.") (citations omitted); 
Morales Rivera v. Sea Land of Puerto Rico, Inc., 418 F.2d 725, 726 (1st Cir. 1969) 
("[Arbitration] agreements are recognized today, but they still are not destructive of 
jurisdiction. They are, precisely, agreements, and as such may be pleaded as a personal 
defense. However, like any such right, they may be waived."). 
Furthermore, this Court's holding in Chandler is entirely consistent with federal 
precedent regarding arbitration. Like the Uniform Arbitration Act, the Federal 
Arbitration Act is a statute that facilitates private dispute resolution through arbitration. 
See 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. Similar to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-4(l) (1999), the Federal 
Arbitration Act also contains a provision instructing federal district courts to order 
arbitration where an enforceable arbitration agreement exists between the parties: 
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If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United 
States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing 
for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being 
satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to 
arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the 
parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the 
stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration. 
9 U.S.C. § 3 (emphasis added). 
While interpreting this seemingly mandatory language, federal courts have 
uniformly held that arbitration is a contractual right that can be waived, either expressly 
or impliedly by the parties. For example, the Tenth Circuit has repeatedly explained that, 
despite "a strong federal policy encouraging the expeditious and inexpensive resolution 
of disputes through arbitration,... '[T]he right to arbitration, like any other contract 
right, can be waived."' Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 
1482, 1488-89 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Reid Burton Const, Inc. v. Carpenters Dist. 
Council ofS. Colo., 614 F.2d 698, 702 (10th Cir 1980)). 
In sum, Chandler and its progeny are completely consistent with both state and 
federal case law regarding waiver of the right to arbitrate. It is telling that Wolf has 
failed to cite a single case holding that the right to arbitrate is mandatory, jurisdictional 
and/or nonwaivable. On the other hand, as illustrated by the host of case law cited above, 
courts throughout the country routinely and uniformly hold that arbitration is a 
contractual right that can be expressly or impliedly waived. 
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D. Public Policy Would be Served By Allowing the Parties to Move 
Forward with the Litigation. 
Finally, Wolf also argues that the parties should be forced to arbitrate their 
disputes because public policy favors arbitration. See Wolfs Brief at 47-48. ASCU does 
not dispute that arbitration implicates important public policy concerns. However, the 
trial court correctly held that under the circumstances presented by this case, "[t]he 
reasons Utah courts favor arbitration, expedience and conservation of resources, would 
be largely defeated by conducting arbitration this late." (R. 4005-36, see esp. 4034). 
As explained above, though some of the extensive discovery conducted heretofore 
could be used in a potential arbitration, much of it would need to be redone because Wolf 
has included nine other landowners, who have not participated in discovery, in its 
demand for arbitration. Additionally, the voluminous discovery and motion practice that 
has occurred to date would not have occurred in an arbitration setting. Also, Wolf has 
asserted claims against third parties who are not subject to the SPA Agreement. As such, 
even if this Court compels arbitration, the litigation in the trial court will continue to 
move forward. Compelling arbitration at this late hour would only result in inefficient 
duplication of efforts, unnecessary expense and further delay, all to the detriment of the 
ASC Parties, the Park City community, and the greater public. 
Moreover, Wolfs position that the right to arbitration is non-waivable under any 
circumstances patently undermines the public policy reasons favoring arbitration. If 
Wolfs position is upheld, there would be nothing to stop a party from litigating a case all 
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the way to the close of evidence at trial and, if it then senses an unfavorable outcome, 
filing a motion to compel arbitration before the jury returns the verdict, which the court 
would "have" to grant so long as an arbitration agreement existed. This would be an 
absurd and unjust result that is entirely inconsistent with the public policy of expedient 
resolution of disputes and conservation of resources. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should enter an order affirming the trial court's 
decision denying Wolfs Motion to Compel Arbitration and remand this case forthwith to 
the trial court for further proceedings consistent with that ruling. 
DATED this of December, 2009. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
John R. Lund 
Kara L. Pettit 
Attoneysfor the ASC Parties 
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A. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-4 (1999) 
B. Ruling and Order Dated August 11, 2009 (R. 2546-66) 
ADDENDUM A 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-4 (1999): 
(1) The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an 
arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is 
raised concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of 
the matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine those issues 
and order or deny arbitration accordingly. 
(2) If an issue subject to arbitration under the alleged arbitration 
agreement is involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court 
having jurisdiction to hear motions to compel arbitration, the motion shall 
be made to that court. Otherwise, the motion shall be made to a court with 
proper venue. 
(3) An order to submit an agreement to arbitration stays any action 
or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration under the agreement. 
However, if the issue is severable from the other issues in the action or 
proceeding, only the issue subject to arbitration is stayed. If a motion is 
made in an action or proceeding, the order for arbitration shall include a 
stay of the action or proceeding. 
(4) Refusal to issue an order to arbitrate may not be grounded on a 
claim that an issue subject to arbitration lacks merit, or that fault or grounds 
for the claim have not been shown. 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ASC UTAH, INC a Maine 
c o r p o r a t i o n , dba THE CANYONS, RULING and ORDER 
P l a i n t i f f , Case No. 060500297 
v s . Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
WOLF MOUNTAIN RESORTS, LC, a 
Utah l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y company, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
WOLF MOUNTAIN RESORTS, LC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ASC UTAH, a Maine corporation, 
dba THE CANYONS; AMERICAN Case No. 060500404 
SKIING COMPANY, INC., a 
Delaware corporation; AMERICAN 
SKIING COMPANY RESORT 
PROPERTIES, INC. a Maine 
corporation; CORPORATE DOES 1-
50; LESLIE B. OTTEN; BLAISE 
CARRIG; INDIVIDUAL DOES 1-50, 
Defendants 
STEPHEN A. OSGUTHORPE; D.A. 
OSGUTHORPE individually and in 
his capacity as Trustee of the 
DR. D.A. OSGUTHORPE TRUST; and 
D.A. OSGUTHORPE FAMILY 
PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WOLF MOUNTAIN RESORTS, LC, 
Defendant. 
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, as 
Personal Representative of the 
Estate of ENOCH SMITH, JR., 
Intervener, 
STEPHEN A. OSGUTHORPE; D.A. 
OSGUTHORPE, individually and in 
his capacity as Trustee of the 
DR. D.A. OSGUTHORPE TRUST; and 
D.A. OSGUTHORPE FAMILY 
PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ASC UTAH, INC; AMERICAN SKIING 
COMPANY; and LESLIE B. OTTEN, 
Defendants 
Case no. 070500018 
(formerly SL Department 
case 060913348 
Case No. 070500520 
DATE: August 11, 2009 
The above matter came before the court on August 5, 2009, 
for oral argument on Wolf's motion to stay proceedings. 
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ASCU was present through John R. Lund, John P. Ashton, and 
Kara L. Petit; Wolf was present through David M. Wahlquist and 
Rod N. Andreason; and Osguthorpe was present through David 
Scofield. 
Wolf filed this motion on July 8, 2009. ASCU filed an 
opposition on July 23, 2009. Wolf filed a reply and a request to 
submit on July 30, 2009. The court, however, based on the July 
21, 2009, scheduling conference, had already on July 22, 2009 set 
the matter for argument on August 5, 2009. 
Oral argument was held and the court took the issues under 
advisement. Before the hearing the court carefully considered the 
memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties. Since 
taking the issues under advisement, the court has further 
considered the law and facts relating to the issues. Now being 
fully advised, the court renders the following Ruling and Order. 
BACKGROUND 
This case has a long procedural history not repeated here. 
Most recently, the court denied Wolf's motion to compel 
arbitration on June 26, 2009. On July 8, 2009, Wolf filed a 
notice of appeal and this motion to stay. The appeal is filed 
under the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act, UCA 78B-11-101, 129. 
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ARGUMENTS 
Wolf moves the court for an order staying the claims 
asserted in this case (060500297 and 060500404) relating to the 
SPA Agreement pending the appeal taken by Wolf from this court's 
denial of Wolf's motion to compel arbitration. 
Because ASCU's first amended complaint alleges breaches of 
the SPA Agreement relating to alleged failures to convey land 
required by that agreement, refusing a closing, and failing to 
consent to and execute documents needed to facilitate that 
development, and because the first amended complaint alleges also 
that Wolf interfered with economic relations under the SPA 
Agreement, and that there were disagreements under that 
Agreement, Wolf brought a motion to compel arbitration. Wolf 
also brought counterclaims under the SPA Agreement, and in its 
complaint in 060500404 all claims relate to the SPA Agreement. 
From these facts Wolf argues it has a right to appeal and 
this court has the power to stay the proceedings. 
Wolf also claims this court has no jurisdiction to consider 
the SPA claims given the filing of the notice of appeal. The 
status quo should be maintained until the issue of arbitration is 
determined by the appellate court. That court could determine 
this case ought to be arbitrated entirely, thus creating great 
expense and waste of time if litigation is pursued. 
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Alternatively, Wolf claims, the court should stay the entire 
case if the SPA claims cannot be segregated effectively. 
In opposition the ASC parties (ASCU) argue the motion to 
compel arbitration was filed three years after litigation 
commenced, and two months before discovery was complete. The 
court denied the motion. Expert disclosures are to occur by mid-
August 200 9. 
In addition, the statute under which the appeal is taken 
does not discuss staying proceedings. The statute could have 
included such a provision but did not. 
Further, the court's order denying the motion to compel is 
not a final order and there is no binding authority that compels 
a stay of the proceedings. The appellate court rules provide 
that this court is to examine the issue first and those rules do 
not require a stay be issued. 
Additionally, ASCU asserts that there is no implication in 
the rules that the court is divested of jurisdiction. Other 
jurisdictions have ruled the trial court is not required to stay 
the proceedings after the denial of a motion to compel 
arbitration. 
ASCU acknowledges it would be almost impossible to stay 
only the SPA claims. The claims collaterally related to the golf 
course and SPA claims are throughout the case. 
-5-
Finally, discovery is all but finished and expert discovery 
is almost finished. ASCU argues this is merely a tactic of Wolf 
to delay litigation. The reasons for denying the arbitration 
motion are fully persuasive here. 
In reply Wolf points out that the appeal is not 
interlocutory but statutorily allowed. Thus, Wolf argues, this 
court is divested of jurisdiction. A stay will merely preserve 
the status quo and will not "undo" anything that has been done. 
Wolf also argues this court should not assume it will be upheld 
in its denial of the motion to compel arbitration. Wolf also 
argues again the SPA claims are indeed severable. 
DISCUSSION 
It is clear and the parties agree that this court has the 
ability to grant a stay of these proceedings. It also has the 
discretion not to do so, as is clearly implied in the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, Rule 8. That rule provides that an 
application for a stay of "judgment" is to be made to the trial 
court, and if the motion is denied by the trial court, the motion 
must be made to the appellate court. Clearly this implies that 
the trial court has the discretion to deny the request for a 
stay. 
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The appeal is filed under the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act, 
and provides at UCA 78B-11-I29, that "An appeal may be taken 
from :(a) an order denying a motion to compel arbitration; . . ." 
Wolf cites to another provision of that act, UCA 78B-11-108, for 
the proposition that this court should stay the proceedings. 
That section deals with a motion to compel arbitration, and 
states the trial court shall stay the litigation until the motion 
to compel arbitration is decided. In fact this court concludes 
that section argued by Wolf favors ASCU, not Wolf. Clearly the 
legislature understood, in enacting this uniform act, the concept 
of staying proceedings. Yet, in 78B-11-129 dealing with appeals, 
a stay of the proceedings is NOT commanded or even mentioned. 
That statute is silent as to whether a stay should be or must be 
granted. Clearly, then, this court has the discretion to stay or 
not stay this litigation while the appeal is pending. 
Wolf argues this court is divested of jurisdiction. Wolf 
provided a case to the court at oral argument for the first time, 
McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Services, 413 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 
2005). ASCU also did not have an opportunity to respond to that 
case in writing. 
Wolf relies, apart from McCauley, on cases which involved a 
final judgment. As Wolf notes, the final judgment rule is clear 
that a trial court is divested of jurisdiction, with some minor 
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exceptions such as a Rule 60(b) issue or other collateral issues. 
The cases relied on by Wolf, such as Powell v. Cannon, 119 P. 3d 
199 (UT 2008) discuss final judgments and their exceptions. 
Where a final judgment, ending the controversy between all 
parties, is entered, the trial court loses jurisdiction over 
those issues involved in the appeal after a notice of appeal is 
filed. 
This denial of the motion to compel arbitration is NOT a 
final judgment, as the parties agree. This case remains wholly 
unresolved as to any party. This statutory appeal therefore is 
much more like an interlocutory appeal than it is like an appeal 
from a final judgment. This appeal is in the middle of the case, 
almost no issues finally are resolved, and it seeks to delay this 
case during the pendency of the appeal whether that is the intent 
of Wolf or not. While the statute (UCA 78B-11-129) allows the 
appeal, the appeal is an exception to the final judgment rule 
which gives the appellate court jurisdiction upon the filing of a 
notice of appeal. All parties agree that the appellate court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under that statute, so it is not 
precisely like an interlocutory appeal where there is discretion 
on behalf of the appellate court whether to entertain the appeal. 
Thus, this court concludes that an appeal of an order 
denying the motion to compel arbitration does not automatically 
render this court without jurisdiction. In a "true" 
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discretionary interlocutory appeal situation the trial court is 
not divested of jurisdiction until the appellate court accepts 
the interlocutory appeal and declares, in essence, that the 
appeal is then as if from a final judgment. Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, Rule 5(e) and (f). 
This court's view then is that this court is not 
AUTOMATICALLY divested of jurisdiction at this point. Whether 
this court follows the rationale of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, or that of other circuits, the 
court believes it is required to evaluate and examine the appeal 
and its merits, which in turn requires a consideration of the 
order from which the appeal is taken. Some federal cases cited 
by the parties, in analogous situations under the federal 
arbitration act, have determined that the filing of the notice of 
appeal from a denial of a motion to compel arbitration divests 
the trial court of jurisdiction. The Ninth and Second circuits, 
however, have specifically held that an appeal from a denial of a 
motion to compel arbitration does not require a stay of 
litigation as the appeal issues are not the same as are involved 
in the litigation. Even the courts that hold a stay is to occur 
discuss that the trial court must determine that the appeal is 
not frivolous and if it is, no stay is required. The Tenth 
circuit, in McCauley, indicated that the divestiture of 
jurisdiction is NOT AUTOMATIC. Under the federal arbitration 
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act, 9 USC 1 et.seq, the appeal is styled "interlocutory." The 
Utah statute, of course, does not use that language. However, as 
noted, to this court this appeal, while statutory, is still 
interlocutory in the sense that it is before a final judgment, 
though not in the sense that the appeal requires the permission 
of an appellate court to proceed. 
Moreover, while McCauley dealt with a denial of arbitration, 
its premise is based on cases that deal with other issues that in 
this court's view weaken the argument that a trial court loses 
jurisdiction upon the filing of a notice of appeal from a denial 
of a motion to compel. McCauley bases its comments about 
divestiture of jurisdiction largely on a case that dealt not with 
arbitration, but with an appeal from a denial of a summary 
judgment motion on the basis that qualified immunity would 
prevent a trial from happening entirely as to that defendant who 
claimed qualified immunity. That type of interlocutory appeal 
would seem to require a trial court to completely halt litigation 
because the very question is whether a particular defendant 
should be forced to go to trial at all. See also, for example, in 
a case that criticizes the dicta of McCauley and reinforces that 
the appeal notice divests jurisdiction in the trial court in an 
interlocutory appeal where a trial would be halted based on 
immunity claims of some of the parties, Walker v. City of Orem, 
451 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2006). 
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Here, the issue on appeal is NOT whether there should be a 
trial, but whether arbitration was waived by three years and 43 
court volumes of litigation. Even if this court is reversed and 
the appellate court rules there was no waiver, there will be a 
remand to this court for a further determination as to whether 
indeed arbitration should occur and on what issues. This appeal 
will NOT, even if Wolf is successful, necessarily halt litigation 
entirely as to Wolf. This case thus does not require a 
divestiture of jurisdiction as in situations like those on which 
the Tenth circuit cases rely. 
Because this motion seeks to halt litigation during the 
pendency of the appeal, this court strongly believes that it must 
examine the merits of the appeal. IF this court relies on the 
doctrines of the Tenth circuit, which of course are not binding 
on this court, this court may examine the appeal to determine if 
it is Mfrivolous." Other courts allow and require the trial 
court to determine if the appeal issues are "substantial." That 
doctrine, at least in the Tenth circuit, seemingly came from 
Stewart v Donges, 915 F.2d 512 (10th Cir. 1990) . That case did 
not involve arbitration but an interlocutory appeal from a 
summary judgment motion denial in the context of claimed immunity 
from suit. That case and later McCauley noted that if the trial 
court declares the appeal is frivolous, the trial court does not 
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lose jurisdiction. Thus, implicit in that body of law, whatever 
context the appeal fits in, is that the trial court MUST to some 
extent examine the nature and quality of the appeal. Some of the 
federal cases cited discuss that a trial court is not powerless 
to deal with manipulation. This court is NOT saying this appeal 
is manipulation, but the discussion in those cases makes clear 
that a trial court must examine the appeal and its quality. That 
necessarily involves the notion that a party could certainly seek 
to delay proceedings, continue a trial, or otherwise obstruct the 
prosecution of a case simply by appealing any ruling and claiming 
it has merit and that the proceedings ought to be stayed during 
the appeal. Of course in a "true" interlocutory appeal, the 
appellate court normally acts quickly in granting or denying 
permission for an interlocutory appeal and so the delay is 
minimal. ASCU in this case argues that Wolf is seeking to delay 
this case. This court will discuss that further below. 
Under any determination of a request to stay, it appears to 
this court that it MUST examine the viability of the appeal 
claims. As an example of horrors, if this case, for example, 
were set for trial in two years and the day before trial a party 
made a motion to compel arbitration, the court no doubt would be 
justified in denying the motion on some basis: either simply 
because it was untimely, there had been a waiver, it was too late 
under the case management order, it was for purposes of delay, or 
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any number of possible reasons. That party could then, with 
notice of appeal in hand, argue there must be a stay. OF COURSE 
the trial court would be COMPELLED to examine the merits, or lack 
of merit, in the appeal, before it could justifiably delay the 
trial on that basis. To conclude otherwise would be simply to 
allow any party at any time for any or no reason to delay 
litigation by filing a motion to compel arbitration, no matter 
how frivolous, and then file a notice of appeal. There must be 
an ability of a trial court to examine the appeal issues, whether 
for frivolousness or something else, or trial courts would lose 
all ability to in any manage the litigation. Of course, this 
said, Rule 11 sanctions are always available to the trial court, 
but that too requires a court to examine the merits of a 
pleading. The court believes it must examine the "merits" of the 
appeal, and necessarily the issues underlying that appeal, to 
determine if the appeal justifies a stay of litigation. 
Thus, this court must examine, to some extent, the previous 
denial of the motion to compel to determine if this appeal is 
frivolous or otherwise, and to determine what effect that appeal, 
whatever its merits, ought to have on this pending lengthy and 
detailed litigation. 
First, the court responds to Wolf's assertion that this 
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court should not "assume" it will be upheld. OF COURSE this court 
assumes it will be upheld. As discussed at oral argument, for 
this court not to assume it will be upheld would be to assume it 
would NOT be upheld. If this court assumed it would not be 
sustained on appeal, certainly this court wisely should have 
granted the motion to compel. In considering the motion of Wolf 
to compel arbitration, the court believed it had to either grant 
or deny the motion, compel arbitration or not. The court 
believed and continues to believe, or assumes, that the long, 
long (44 volume at this moment, a docket of over 70 pages)) 
history of this case is inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate 
and thus arbitration has been waived. Had the court believed 
arbitration was not waived, the court may have granted Wolf's 
motion to compel arbitration. For this court to rule as it has, 
and NOT assume it was correct would have required this court to 
reach just the opposite result from what it reached. 
This court is most assuredly aware that it can be, has been, 
and will almost certainly in the future be reversed, and possibly 
in this case on this very issue, but the court certainly does not 
ASSUME it will be reversed. This court maintains no illusions 
about any "infallibility" but the court reached the decision it 
thought was right and this court continues to think it was right. 
However, this court will recognize that the appellate courts of 
this state are to be fully heeded and respected and this court is 
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fully bound by their determinations. 
As noted in the denial of the motion to compel, which 
reasoning this court fully incorporates into this ruling and 
order, this court ruled Wolf had waived the right to arbitrate 
because it fully (over three years, 44 volumes to be no doubt 45 
and beyond by the time this ruling is received, over 70 page 
docket statement) participated in litigation inconsistent with an 
intent to arbitrate. 
At oral argument Wolf in essence "blamed" this court for its 
untimely motion to compel arbitration. Wolf argued that it did 
not believe, prior to April 29, 2009, that Wolf had claims that 
could be arbitrated, and that the SPA Agreement did not require 
Wolf to arbitrate. Then, Wolf argues, on April 29, 2009, this 
court said Wolf must arbitrate and only then did Wolf know it 
could arbitrate and it quickly moved to compel such. 
This court rejects that argument as a basis for Wolf's claim 
that it did not waive arbitration because it did not know until 
then that it could arbitrate. 
Whatever the SPA Agreement says, Wolf was aware of it fully 
long before April 29, 2009. If Wolf did not believe it could 
arbitrate under that agreement, it evidently acted on that basis. 
If Wolf believed it could arbitrate under that agreement, it 
should have moved to compel arbitration long ago. This court did 
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NOT rule on April 29, 2009, that Wolf MUST or COULD or SHOULD 
arbitrate. 
The court's comments in that ruling and order of April 29, 
2009, appear on page 18 of that ruling. They will be set out 
herein, but they were made in the context of denying a motion of 
Wolf to add several third parties associated with that SPA 
agreement. The court specifically stated: 
While the court need not and does not base its decision on 
this argument, the court agrees with third party defendants 
that the SPA Agreement does require arbitration. Thus, any 
claim by Wolf that the SPA agreement was violated in some 
way is subject to the mandatory arbitration provision in 
that agreement. Section 5.8.1 et.seq. 
Consequently, because the third party defendants are 
not liable to Wolf allowance of the third party complaint is 
improper under Rule 14, URCP. 
This court specifically stated it was NOT basing its 
decision to disallow third parties to be joined on the 
arbitration provision of the SPA agreement, but on Rule 14 and 
for other reasons. For Wolf to now argue that it had no 
arbitration right known to it until this court ruled it had such: 
right is not persuasive. Whatever the SPA agreement requires, 
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Wolf is entitled to have its own opinion and could have claimed 
its "right" to arbitrate. This court did NOT rule that Wolf had 
a right to arbitrate. 
Given the lengthy history of this case, over three years 
into litigation, the court does believe that Wolf has, as one 
case put it, tested the judicial waters and found them bitter and 
is thus seeking arbitration. This court has simply ruled Wolf is 
too late and waived its right to do so. 
While Wolf clearly has the statutory right to appeal under 
this somewhat exceptional statute, a party does not have the 
right to delay litigation indefinitely. Certainly this statute 
has its limits. This court is NOT suggesting Wolf is engaged in 
such behavior, but following Wolf's rationale, presumably under 
this statute a motion to compel arbitration could be filed, 
within the confines of Rule 11, that had no merit whatever and if 
it is denied this court would have to stay the litigation while 
that appeal is litigated. This court cannot imagine that a trial 
court must simply put on hold all litigation for perhaps a year 
while the appellate court process is completed. That certainly 
seems to be the reasoning of the cases that allow a trial court 
to determine if an appeal is frivolous. Thus, it simply becomes 
a question of degree, does the merit of an appeal outweigh the 
interests in proceeding with ongoing, lengthy litigation. 
This court does not know what the tenth circuit meant when 
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it discussed "frivolous" appeals. Again, this court may well be 
reversed by an appellate court, but as this court now sees it, 
given the vast authorities discussing waiver of arbitration, 
(See, for example, Smile, Inc Asia Pte. Ltd v. BriteSmile 
Management, 122 P. 3d 654 (UT App 2005)) this appeal lacks 
sufficient merit, it does not have substantial merit, to justify 
delaying this case. This court is not able or willing to declare 
this appeal "frivolous" as this court does not know if that means 
it has a zero percent chance of prevailing, a 10% chance, or a 
30% chance. The court is willing to declare and conclude that 
the appeal, for all the reasons discussed herein and in the June 
26, 2009, ruling and order, incorporated herein, lacks sufficient 
merit and is not substantial enough to justify putting this three 
year old case on hold for perhaps another year or at least a good 
portion of a year during the pendency of an appeal. An appeal 
will determine whether, and ONLY whether, this court erred in 
concluding there has been a waiver of arbitration. If the 
appellate court determines there has been no waiver, it still 
remains for this court on remand to determine if arbitration must 
occur and what claims are arbitrable. 
This court believes this appeal is at best an unsupportable 
and insubstantial appeal and the filing of a notice of appeal 
does not render a trial court unable to proceed, unless the 
appellate court so rules. It will have to do so in this case as 
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this court will not grant a stay. 
A trial date has been set in this case beginning April 2010 
and unless the appellate court grants a stay, this court intends 
to proceed with that trial. 
Wolf's argument about the common sense notion of simply not 
expending time and energy if an appellate court determines this 
case should move down the arbitration track is rejected under the 
same reasoning as above. 
The court does not believe that any one would benefit from 
attempting to parse or segregate claims. Despite Wolf's 
suggestion about wasting time and resources and money and effort, 
proceeding with this case on part of the claims would be the 
extreme example of that, given the nature of the inter-related 
claims and contentions of the parties. 
The motion to stay the proceedings is DENIED. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
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order is required. 
DATED this day of , 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
-20-
Case No: 060500297 
Date: Aug 11, 2 009 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 060500297 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
MAIL: ROD N ANDREASON 60 E SOUTH TEMPLE STE 1800 P 0 BOX 4512 0 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145-0120 
MAIL: JOHN P ASHTON 36 SOUTH STATE ST STE 1900 SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84111-1478 
MAIL: JASON D BOREN 201 S MAIN ST STE 800 SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
MAIL: J. ANGUS EDWARDS POB 45444 SALT LAKE CITY UT 84145-0444 
MAIL: VICTORIA C FITLOW 591 SUMMIT DRIVE PARK CITY UT 84098-5315 
MAIL: RYAN B FRAZIER 60 E SOUTH TEMPLE SUITE 1800 EAGLE GATE TOWER 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84145-0120 
MAIL: MARK R GAYLORD LITIGATION DEPARTMENT 201 S MAIN ST STE 800 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111-2221 
MAIL: GUY P KROESCHE 201 S MAIN ST STE 1100 SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84111-4904 
MAIL: JOHN R LUND 10 EXCHANGE PLACE 11TH FLR POB 45000 SALT LAKE 
CITY UT 84145-5000 
MAIL: MATTHEW L MONCUR 201 S MAIN ST STE 800 SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84111-2221 
MAIL: DAVID L MORTENSEN 201 S MAIN ST STE 1100 SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84111-4904 
MAIL: PAUL H PETERS 459 HANA HIGHWAY PAIA HI 96779 
MAIL: KARA L PETTIT 10 EXCHANGE PLACE 11TH FLR POB 45000 SALT LAKE 
CITY UT 84145-5000 
MAIL: DAVID W SCOFIELD 2455 E PARLEYS WAY SUITE 115 SALT LAKE CITY 
UT 84109 
MAIL: LAUREN A SHURMAN LITIGATION DIVISION 201 S MAIN ST STE 1100 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
MAIL: CLARK K TAYLOR 36 S STATE STE 1900 SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
MAIL: CHANDLER P THOMPSON LITIGATION DEPT 50 SO MAIN ST SUITE 1600 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84144 
MAIL: DAVID M WAHLQUIST 60 E S TEMPLE STE 1800 POB 4512 0 SALT LAKE 
CITY UT 84145-0120 
MAIL: HARDIN A WHITNEY CITY CENTER 1 STE 900 175 E 400 S SALT LAKE 
CITY UT 84111 
MAIL: ROBERT G WING 175 E 400 SOUTH STE 900 SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84111 
MAIL: KENNETH W YEATES 170 S MAIN STREET SUITE 500 SALT LAKE CITY 
UT 84101 
Date: |fr] U H 
Deputy Court Clerk 
